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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LIBEL AND
SLANDER-DEFAMATION OF POLITICAL
CANDIDATES
In the fall of 1968, James M. Sprouse was the democratic
gubernatorial candidate in West Virginia. Two weeks prior to the
November election, the Charleston Daily Mail, a newspaper
printed in Charleston, West Virginia, and distributed in Kanawha
and surrounding counties, published two consecutive articles con-
cerning a land transaction in which Sprouse had engaged and
which would return to him significant financial benefit. The mis-
leading statements in the oversized headlines used by the newspa-
per implied the transaction had been illegal, while the contents of
the articles recited truthful facts.'
Sprouse filed a libel action against the newspaper in the Kan-
awha County Circuit Court, alleging that the newspaper had
printed a defamatory, untrue story knowing it to be false at the
time of publication, and had published the articles as part of a
plan or scheme to injure him. The action was dismissed for failure
to state a claim of action upon which relief could be granted.
2
Plaintiff then filed an action in Circuit Court of Fayette County
alleging the same facts. 3 Following a jury trial, judgment was ren-
dered for Sprouse for $250,000 actual damages and $500,000 puni-
tive damages. On appeal, defendants argued that plaintiff had
failed to prove actual malice, as required by New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,4 and that the damage award was excessive. Held: Re-
' Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975), cert.
denied, 96 S. Ct. 145 (1975). The entire text of the two published articles are
reproduced in the appendix of the case. The words "disclosed," "bonanza" and
"cleanup" were used in the headlines of the first article, and "land grab" and
"dummy firm" were contained in the headlines of the second article. Sprouse
alleged that the use of these terms implied illegality of his land transactions.
2 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
This was a major point of error argued on appeal by the defendant. The
defendant charged that the prior dismissal barred the present suit because of res
judicata. The court acknowledged that this would be the correct rule for future
dismissals unless the lower court specifically dismisses without prejudice (Sprouse
had been dismissed without the specific statement) but declined to include the
Sprouse case in the new rule. 211 S.E.2d at 693-96.
1 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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versed in part, affirmed in part. Sprouse v. Clay Communication,
Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975), cert. denied 96 S. Ct. 145
(1975). The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that
"once an overall plan or scheme to injure has been established, an
unreasonable deviation between headlines and the remainder of
the presentation is in and of itself evidence of actual malice, which,
along with other evidence, supports a jury verdict for libel."'
Because this was an issue of first impression in the United
States, the West Virginia court was faced with the difficult task
of developing new law in this constitutional area without the bene-
fit of precedent. Thus, the court could only be guided by the land-
mark case of New York Times and its progeny."
Prior to the 1964 New York Times decision, the law of defama-
tion was governed by state law.' The Times decision established
constitutional protection for false or defamatory statements, on
the basis of the first amendment.' In West Virginia, prior to Times,
the victim of a defamatory statement could recover unless the
defendant could prove the truth of his statement and his good
motives for publishing it,I or establish that his statement was priv-
ileged and that he had not abused that privilege." If the article was
found to be defamatory on its face-libel per se-malice and dam-
age to the plaintiff's reputation were presumed." The publisher's
effort to ascertain the truth of the story was immaterial, as he
published at his own peril.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan the United States Su-
preme Court established a constitutional standard of protection,
based on the first amendment, for a publisher of alleged defama-
211 S.E.2d at 680-81.
Id. at 680.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 112 (4th ed. 1971).
376 U.S. at 268.
"In prosecutions and civil suits for libel, the truth may be given in evidence;
and if it shall appear to the jury, that the matter charged as libelous, is true, and
was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the verdict shall be for
the defendant." W. VA. CONsT. art. 3, § 8 (emphasis added).
11 Parker v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 126 W. Va. 666, 30 S.E.2d 1
(1944).
" Rigney v. Keesee & Co., 104 W. Va. 168, 139 S.E. 650 (1927); accord, City
of Mullens v. Davidson, 133 W. Va. 557,57 S.E.2d 1 (1949). (The burden of proving
malice is on the plaintiff unless the language is so calumnious as to infer malice).
'1 Rigney v. Keesee & Co., 104 W. Va. 168, 139 S.E. 650 (1927).
[Vol. 78
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tory statements. The new standard compelled an individual who
was a public official to prove, with "convincing clarity,"' 3 that the
defendant published the defamatory statement with knowledge of
its falsity or reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the state-
ment.'4 This is the "actual malice" standard. The Times case elim-
inated the presumption of malice and damages in such cases.' 5
Following Times, in Garrison v. Louisiana,'" the Court held
that a truthful statement concerning a public official was constitu-
tionally protected regardless of whether common law malice was
present.'" The Court later extended the Times doctrine to include
public figures'" and candidates for public office.' 9
In a 1971 case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 0 the Court,
in a plurality decision, held that a private individual who was
involved in a newsworthy event would be bound by the Times
standard.2' Rosenbloom enabled the newspaper to decide what
standard would apply merely by publishing an event and thus
rendering it newsworthy. In 1975 the Court severely limited
Rosenbloom with its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." In
Gertz the Court determined that merely being involved in a news-
worthy event was not sufficient to require a plaintiff to meet the
burden of the Times actual malice standard. The Court held that
absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the com-
munity and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an
individual would not be deemed a public figure, and the more
meaningful test is to consider the nature and extent of an individ-
376 U.S. at 285-86.
" Id. at 279-80.
Id. at 267, 278.
, 379 U.S. 64 (1964). Garrison held that the New York Times standard also
measured the constitutional restriction upon state power to impose criminal sanc-
tions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials.
" 379 U.S. at 73. The Supreme Court cited with approval a New Hampshire
decision, State v. Burnham, 9 N.H. 34, 42, 31 A.D. 217 (1837), stating: "If upon a
lawful occasion for making a publication, he has published the truth, and no more,
there is no sound principle which can make him liable, even if he was actuated by
express malice."
"1 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (former football coach
against publisher of magazine).
'" Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971) (candidate for Senate
against newspaper).
403 U.S. 29 (1971).
Id. at 31-32.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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ual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the
defamation.?
Beginning with the Times decision the Court has established
limitations upon state libel prosecutions imposed by the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. It is in this
context that the Sprouse decision must be analyzed, considering
the constitutional requirements of the actual malice standard and
the amount of evidence necessary to satisfy such a constitutional
demand.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Sprouse
made several important and new findings of law in holding that the
plaintiff had met the constitutionally imposed burden of actual
malice. The court construed the oversized headlines separately,
without regard to the mitigating material in the body of the story,
in deciding whether the newspaper had published defamatory
statements. The court also determined the mere existence of mis-
leading headlines, unsupported by the body of the story, to be
evidence of intent to injure through publication of false, defama-
tory statements known at the time of publication to be false."
The court in Sprouse found that no clear rule had been estab-
lished regarding whether headlines which were not libelous per se
could be considered separately from the body of the story."2 The
court concluded that each case must be considered on its facts, and
since the defendant had used oversized headlines with the inten-
tion of misleading the reader, the headlines could be considered
separately from the body."6 The court cited Empire Printing Co.
v. Roden" in support of its conclusion, but a careful reading of
Roden reveals that its holding was contrary to the court's conclu-
sion in Sprouse. The court in Roden held that headlines alone
could contain language capable of supporting a libel action, but
the headlines and story must still be construed as a whole.?1 The
Roden court found support in the United States Supreme Court
21 Id. at 352.
21 211 S.E.2d at 682.
25 Id. at 686.
2 Id.
2 247 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1957).
21 Id. at 13. The court stated: "This is a question of fact for the jury to deter-
mine, from a consideration of all of the evidence in the case, and from a careful
consideration of the publications in their entirety, including headlines, and any
reasonable imputations or deductions arising therefrom." Id.
[Vol. 78
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case of Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner, which held that "[a]
publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed
in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would
ordinarily understand it. So the whole item, including display
lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and
signification thus determined."2 In another Supreme Court case,
Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler,0 a case
factually similar to Sprouse, the defendant newspaper company
had been held liable for describing a land transaction between
plaintiff and city officials as "blackmail," thus implying that the
plaintiff had committed a crime. The newspaper had published
headlines containing the word "deal" and a sub-headline consist-
ing solely of the word "blackmail."'" The same terminology had
been used by several citizens at a town meeting which was covered
by the defendant's reporters. The Supreme Court found the use of
such double meaning words was not libel because any reader who
reached the word "blackmail" in the body of the story in either
article would have understood exactly what was meant.2 Thus the
Court implied that the entire article, headlines and body, must be
construed as a whole in determining whether the newspaper in-
tended to impute the commission of a crime or merely to report on
the town meeting.?
Therefore, the better rule, espoused in Chaloner and the ma-
jority of other cases confronting the issue,3' is that in order to
determine the intent of a newspaper article it should be construed
- 250 U.S. 290, 293 (1919).
398 U.S. 6 (1970).
3' Id. at 7-8.
32 Id. at 14. The Court stated: "It is simply impossible to believe that a reader
who reached the word 'blackmail' in either article would not have understood
exactly what was meant. . . ." Id.
13 This is similar to Sprouse. In both cases the plaintiff alleged that the writ-
ings were defamatory because of the implied illegality. Yet, in Greenbelt, the Su-
preme Court implied that the entire article must be considered as a whole, while
in Sprouse the West Virginia court construed the headlines separately.
1' See Reardon v. News-Journal Co., 53 Del. 29, 164 A.2d 263 (1960); Floyd v.
Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 102 Ga. App. 840, 117 S.E.2d 260 (1960); Cook v. Atlanta
Newspapers, Inc., 98 Ga. App. 818, 107 S.E.2d 906 (1959); Ledger-Enquirer Co. v.
Brown, 214 Ga. App. 442, 105 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Wade v. Sterling Gazette Co., 56
Ill. App. 2d 101, 205 N.E.2d 44 (1965); Beyl v. Capper Publications, Inc., 180 Kan.
525, 305 P.2d 817 (1957); Powers v. Durgen-Snow Publishing Co., 154 Me. 108, 144
A.2d 294 (1958); Rouse v. Olean Times Herald Corp., 219 N.Y.S. 2d 835 (1961);
Painter v. E.W. Scripps Co., 104 Ohio App. 237, 148 N.E.2d 503 (1957).
5
Romano: Constitutional Law--Libel and Slander--Defamation of Political Ca
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
in its entirety-headlines and body. This is contrary to the holding
in Sprouse.3
In the second part of its decision, the court in Sprouse con-
cluded that the mere existence of misleading headlines, unsup-
ported by the body of the story, was evidence of intent to injure
through publication of false, defamatory statements known at the
time of publication to be false.38 The court inferred that the de-
fendant must have had knowledge that the headlines were mis-
leading or false, or recklessly disregarded the truth because the
body did not support the conclusion that could be drawn from
the headlines alone .3 The court then coupled the discrepancy be-
tween the headlines and the body with the evidence of a scheme
or plan to injure the plaintiff and concluded that this satisfied the
constitutional requirement of actual malice. 38 Such a formula does
not prove, with clear and convincing evidence,3" that the defendant
had knowledge of the falsity of the articles0 or reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of the articles.4'
211 S.E.2d at 686.
3, Id. at 682.
37 The Supreme Court, in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245
(1974), applied the doctrine of respondeat superior to find the publisher liable for
an employee publishing a story with knowledge of its falsity, but in Sprouse, the
West Virginia court, citing Cantrell, used respondeat superior to impute knowledge
of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth from the staff writer of the headlines to
the author of the body of the articles. 211 S.E.2d at 690. This was not the purpose
of the doctrine in Cantrell, as it imputed liability, not knowledge of falsity. Mere
negligence could have caused the discrepancy between the headlines and body in
Sprouse, without anyone having actual knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard
for the truth.
11 211 S.E.2d at 680-81. The court recognized that the discrepancy alone would
be insufficient to support a finding of actual malice, but when coupled with a
scheme to injure, it found that the jury could permissibly infer actual malice. Id.
at 682-83.
11 376 U.S. at 285-86.
10 Since the court upheld the inference of actual malice because of the inconsis-
tency between the headlines and the body, the defendant would have fared better
on appeal if he had printed misleading statements in the body as well! In the latter
instance the court would have at least required the plaintiff to produce more evi-
dence of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard because the inference based on
the inconsistency would not be present.
" The imputation of the defendant's reckless disregard for the truth of the
articles was based on the evidence that the newspaper had schemed with Sprouse's
opponents in order to injure him, coupled with the defendant's lack of responsible
reporting standards. But why, then, did the defendant go to Elkins, the location
[Vol. 78
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The court's language of "an overall plan or scheme to injure"42
is nothing more than a definition of traditional common law mal-
ice, which the court concedes is present between adversaries of
every political campaign.13 Common law malice is not an element
of the constitutional standard of actual malice, which was required
in Sprouse." Common law malice is ill will toward the plaintiff or
wanton disregard for his rights. In contrast, actual malice is merely
a term of art used to describe one's actual knowledge of the truth
or falsity of a published statement, or his reckless disregard for its
truth or falsity. 5 The court in Sprouse described actual malice as
consisting of a deliberate intent to injure (common law malice)
coupled with an intent to injure through the publication of false
or misleading defamatory statements, known to be false, or an
intent to injure through publication of defamatory statements with
reckless and willful disregard for their truth." Somewhere in this
labyrinth of words is the actual malice standard as defined by
Times, but the court in Sprouse added the requirement of common
law malice and used it to subvert the actual malice standard. Once
the plaintiff had proved intent to injure, through a scheme or plan,
then the court in Sprouse permitted the inference of actual malice
from the discrepancy between the headlines and the body of the
article." Such an inference is constitutionally insufficient to estab-
lish actual malice because the plaintiff is relieved from proving
that the defendant actually knew that the statement was false or
that the defendant had a high degree of awareness of probable
falsity." Thus a defendant who merely negligently places mislead-
ing headlines over a factually true article and has ill will towards
the plaintiff could be held liable if the jury is permitted to make
the inference of actual malice from the language of the article
itself,49 without really ascertaining whether the defendant had ac-
where the land transactions had occurred, and investigate the story? Surely if the
defendant's intention were to injure Sprouse, he would not have investigated at all.
'z 211 S.E.2d at 680-81.
" Id. at 681.
" Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966).
' Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 95 S. Ct. 465, 470 (1974).
211 S.E.2d at 681-82.
'7 Id. at 680-81.
St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968), holding that for reckless
disregard of the truth to be established one must have a high degree of awareness
of probable falsity.
11 211 S.E.2d at 681.
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tual knowledge of falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth. A
publisher would be better protected if he printed misleading state-
ments in the body as well so that no discrepancy would exist on
which to base the inference. In essence, the West Virginia court has
allowed liability to be found on the basis of a combination of gen-
eral hostility and a contradiction (discrepancy between the head-
lines and body of the story) in the language of the article itself. A
similar holding was reversed by the Supreme Court in Greenbelt,
where liability had been based on general hostility and a false-
hood.5 0 The Court stated in Greenbelt that this definition of (com-
mon law) malice is constitutionally insufficient where discussion
of public affairs is concerned.' The Sprouse court repeatedly dis-
cussed common law malice in its opinion, almost to the point of
confusion.
The Sprouse court found support for its inclusion of common
law malice in the actual malice standard in the Supreme Court
case of Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts." In Butts, the defendant,
Saturday Evening Post, had accused Butts of "fixing" a college
football game. The article published by the defendant was in no
sense "hot news, '5 3 requiring immediate dissemination, and the
Saturday Evening Post could have conducted a thorough investi-
gation. In Sprouse the defendant had only two weeks in which to
publish his story before the election took place. This was undoubt-
edly "hot news" in Sprouse, but the defendant still made a reason-
able effort to investigate the validity of the story before publishing
it." In Butts, the defendant had relied on a single source of infor-
mation, who was of questionable veracity, and the defendant made
no investigation whatever.5 Thus the cases are easily distinguish-
able on their facts; however, the Butts decision is inapplicable to
Sprouse for a much more compelling reason.
The Butts case was the first in which the Supreme Court
granted first amendment protection to a public figure in addition
to the public official. As the Times standard was relatively new,
the Court was quite cautious in applying the constitutional protec-
398 U.S. at 10.
Id.
Z 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
" Id. at 157. In Butts, the magazine had eight months in which to investigate
the story.
" 211 S.E.2d at 683.
388 U.S. at 157.
[Vol. 78
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tion, and thus made a distinction between a public official and a
public figure 6 by holding that a lesser standard than the Times
actual malice standard could be applied.17 This holding is no longer
valid, as it has continuously been eroded by subsequent Supreme
Court decisions.-" The distinction between a public.official and a
public figure is no longer made by the Court, as the actual malice
standard applies to both with equal force.-"
The jury had awarded the plaintiff in Sprouse $500,000 in
punitive damages, but the court struck this as being excessive. It
held that such excessiveness violated the policy embodied in the
first amendment of encouraging broad dissemination of public in-
formation and would also result in self-censorship."0 Although the
court struck the punitive damages, it boldly stated in dicta that a
plaintiff in Sprouse's position could be permitted to recover puni-
tive damages because of the high degree of proof required to sus-
tain any libel action." The court based this conclusion on its inter-
pretation of the Supreme Court case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc."2
It appears that the West Virginia court would sustain a reasonable
' Id. at 148.
s' Id. at 155. The Court stated:
We consider and would hold that a "public figure" who is not a public
official may also recover damages for a defamatory falsehood whose sub-
stance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of
highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the
standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by respon-
sible publishers.
Id.
5K Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 271 (1971). The Court stated:
But the question is of no importance so far as the standard of liability in
this case is concerned, for it is abundantly clear that, whichever term is
applied, publications concerning candidates must be accorded at least as
much protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments as those
concerning occupants of public office. That New York Times itself was
intended to apply to candidates, in spite of the use of the more restricted
"public official" terminology, is readily apparent from that opinion's text
and citations to case law.
Id. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971); Greenbelt
Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970); Beckley Newspapers
Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967).
' See note 57 supra.
211 S.E.2d at 692.
61 Id.
62 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
211 S.E.2d at 681.
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punitive damage award in a libel action against a public official-
public figure. Such a conclusion is not supported by Gertz. Sprouse
did not involve a private individual,63 as did Gertz;6 thus contrary
to the court's finding in Sprouse, Gertz does not clearly permit a
public figure to recover punitive damages. The Court in Gertz
addressed itself only to the issue of whether a private defamation
plaintiff could recover punitive damages, and it concluded that a
private individual could recover punitive damages if the higher
standard of actual malice were proven."5 A recent federal district
court case, Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co.,66 held that a public figure
defamation plaintiff could not recover punitive damages. In a well
written opinion, the court stated that "the additional state interest
to protect reputation and privacy from special dangers arising out
of highly motivated tortious defamation is not compelling or sub-
stantial in public figure actions."67 The court then concluded "that
the First Amendment precludes plaintiff's recovery of punitive
damages . . . . [T]o grant exemplary damages in public figure
defamation actions . . . is unconstitutional."6 The Supreme
Court has yet to rule definitively whether a public figure or public
official may constitutionally recover punitive damages in a libel
action, but it has questioned the constitutional propriety of such
damages for defamation in recent cases. 9 In Gertz the Supreme
Court discussed the practical effect of punitive damages as "bear-
ing no necessary relation to the actual harm caused," thus ena-
bling the jury to selectively punish expressions of unpopular views.
Such jury discretion would be contrary to the purpose of the first
" 418 U.S. at 352.
418 U.S. at 349-50. The Court stated:
It is necessary to restrict defamation plaintiffs who do not prove knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth to compensation for
actual injury.
... In short, the private defamation plaintiff who establishes liabil-
ity under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times
may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for
actual injury.
384 F. Supp. 166 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
'7 Id. at 172-74.
"Id.
See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 59 (White, J., concurring), 65-78 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), 82-86 (Marshall and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (1971); see also
RsTATEm Nrr (SECOND) OF ToaTs, Explanatory Notes § 621, comments b and f at
286 and 288 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974).
[Vol. 78
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amendment of preventing self-censorship and promoting "uninhi-
bited, robust, and wide-open"70 discussion of public issues.7 The
above analysis would indicate that the Supreme Court will prob-
ably not allow punitive damage recovery in public official-public
figure defamation actions when faced with the issue.
The Sprouse case is the most recent opinion by the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals concerning libel law. The court
may have upheld a just verdict, but in doing so, several dubious
precedential interpretations were handed down, as well as a bold
statement in dicta that punitive damages could be recovered by a
public official-public figure plaintiff.
The court interpreted the Gertz case as clearly allowing recov-
ery of punitive damages by a public official-public figure plaintiff.
Such an assertion was unnecessary and somewhat contradictory
considering the ultimate decision by the court on the issue of
Sprouse's $500,000 punitive damage award. If the court struck the
punitive damages as being excessive under West Virginia damage
law, the statement indicating that nevertheless they are recover-
able in such instances was unnecessary and premature, but the
court then held that such a large punitive damage award was re-
pugnant to the first amendment's policy of promoting robust and
uninhibited discussion of public affairs. It appears that the court
artfully included its determination that punitive damages could be
awarded but simultaneously struck the entire award, which elimi-
nated any possible constitutional conflict.
The Sprouse decision also contained two questionable inter-
pretations of constitutional libel law. By relying on Curtis Publish-
ing Co. v. Butts, the court adopted an actual malice standard of
suspect validity. The more recent Supreme Court cases, especially
Gertz and Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, have severely limited, if not
overruled, the less onerous actual malice standard used in Butts.
The court also intermingled the concept of common law mal-
ice with the constitutional actual malice standard. The introduc-
tion of common law malice into the definition of actual malice only
confuses the jury with regard to the real issue to be resolved. Con-
sequently, the defendant is judged according to his motives for
71 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
71 Id.
11
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publishing the story and not according to whether he knew the
story to be false or whether he had recklessly disregarded the truth.
The Sprouse case was undoubtedly a difficult one to decide,
but when such a fundamental first amendment issue is presented,
the court must review the law applied to the case by the trial court.
More importantly, it must scrutinize the entire evidence of the
trial and determine that the defendant's constitutional rights have
been fully protected.
An unintimidated press is the only way to keep the public
informed about the character and activities of political candidates
and elected officials. Financial intimidation from a libel suit can
be as effective in deterring the publication of an important story
as can governmental censorship. The real impact of the Sprouse
decision has yet to be felt, but it is certain that this decision will
retard, in West Virginia, the robust and uninhibited reporting by
the press that the Constitution has sought to protect.*
David John Romano
* Editors Note: After this article was written the United States Supreme Court
decided Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 44 LW 4262 (March 2, 1976). The case primarily
involved two issues, (1) whether the individual, Mary Alice Firestone, was a public
figure under Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and prior cases, and, (2) whether the
truthful reporting of a judicial proceeding is fully protected under the first amend-
ment.
The Court held that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure because she had
not voluntarily "thrust herself to the forefront of any particular public controversy
in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it" (even though there
was evidence that she had), and that the nature of the controversy (divorce action)
was not the type of public controversy referred to in Gertz. Both of these holdings
were criticized in dissents by Justices Brennen and Marshall.
The Court also rejected the contention that the truthful reporting of a judicial
proceeding is fully protected by the New York Times standard. The Court held that
not all judicial proceedings were of "public or general interest." Thus some reports
of judicial proceedings could be actionable even if truthful. This rationale seems
to be more in accord with a privacy action rather than one for defamation, The
dissents also explore this area.
[Vol. 78
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